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INTRODUCTION

The November 15, 1985, Republic of Ireland-United Kingdom accord,1 recognizing the Republic's formal consultative role in governing British-ruled Northern Ireland, was widely applauded. The
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida; B.A., 1970, Ohio
State; J.D., 1974, Notre Dame; LL.M., 1976, University of Toronto; S.J.D., 1983, University of
Toronto.
EDITOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was presented in Indianapolis, Indiana, at a
program of the International Studies Association/Midwest Annual Meeting on November 7,
1986.
1. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, 24 I.L.M. 1582 (1985) [hereinafter Agreement].
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eyes of the world again were drawn to avowedly pro-popular rule
measures undertaken within Northern Ireland. This article will discuss Northern Ireland in terms of majority rule self-determination
and democratic principles, regardless of whether they follow juridical
international law principles.
The pre-World War I demography of Northern Ireland - the island's six northeastern counties - will be reviewed briefly in light of
the 1918 General Election, which indirectly resulted in severing
Northern Ireland from a newly independent, twenty-six county State
of Ireland. The Northern Ireland border is now a carefully calculated
gerrymander. The application of democratic principles to gerrymandering is examined to clarify the Northern Ireland border's political
validity insofar as it might be defended in the name of majority rule
self-determination.
The constantly approaching, but never arriving, Roman Catholic
absolute majority in Northern Ireland will be investigated. A Catholic
majority is continually diverted because of the disproportionate
Catholic emigration from Northern Ireland. Selective emigration
pressures will be appraised in light of the religiously disparate impact
of Northern Ireland's unemployment. The dubious democratic validity of deliberate political manipulation of Ireland's demography
merely to sustain the purported majority endorsement of an incumbent regime will become apparent.
The discussions concerning gerrymandering and the political manipulation of demography will suggest that perpetuation of a Northern Ireland divided from today's Republic of Ireland might be challenged democratically in the name of majority rule selfdetermination. This assessment of the Northern Ireland border
against a democratic standard remains vital in 1987 because most
Northern Ireland Catholics have never acknowledged the legitimacy
of Northern Ireland. Some have continuously sought to destroy
Northern Ireland by political and military means, according to Conor
Cruise O'Brien, a noted foe of the Irish Republican Army (IRA).2
The oversimplified equation herein of Protestant with Unionist and
of Catholic with nationalist is useful, although not conclusive, be2.
[M]ore than a third of the population of the Protestant State are Catholics, and most of
these have never acknowledged the legitimacy of a State in which they were included
against their will. Of this alienated fraction a very small but dangerous minority - in
the form of the Irish Republican Army - has always sought to bring down the State
through combined political and military action. This small minority has always enjoyed
widespread, if nervous, sympathy among the Catholic population of Northern Ireland.
C. O'BRIEN,

STATES OF IRELAND

128 (1972).
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cause in Northern Ireland a close correlation between political affilia3
tion and religion exists.

An assessment of the Northern Ireland border against a democratic standard is appropriate and timely especially in light of the
1979 and 1980 litigation before the European Commission of Human
Rights, the 1982 Anglo-Argentinian Falkland Islands War, and the
evolving interpretation of American constitutional law presented by
the United States Supreme Court during 1986. These developments
helped cast light upon the democratic logic of majority rule self-determination. Both Irish nationalists and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have made explicit, public appeals to the logic of
Northern Ireland's "self-determination" and "democracy."
II.
A.

THE GERRYMANDER ISSUE

The 1918 General Election

In 1911, Ireland's six northeastern counties of Antrim, Down, Armagh, Derry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh included 820,370 Protestants
and 430,161 Catholics. 4 Yet in the nine-county province of Ulster encompassing these six,5 the Protestant majority was far smaller:
890,880 Protestant versus 690,816 Catholics.' The Catholic majority
was dominant in the counties of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan.7
The Protestant minority therein varied from 18.5 percent to 25.3 percent." In Fermanagh and Tyrone, the Protestant minorities comprised only 43.8 percent and 44.6 percent of the populace,
respectively.'
3. "While not every Protestant was a Unionist or every Catholic a nationalist, there was
and is a very close correlation between religious and political affiliation in Northern Ireland." J.
CURRAN, THE BIRTH OF THE IRISH FREE STATE

1921-1923, at 296 n.6 (1980).

4. Id. "[A] six-counties Northern Ireland with a 66 per cent Protestant majority, 820,370
non-Catholics to 430,161 Catholics, would be safe for Protestantism and Unionism." P. BUCKLAND, A HISTORY OF NORTHEN IRELAND 20 (1981).
5.
In the 16th century Ulster was divided into shires, nine in all, but one of these was
Cavan, which till then was regarded as part of Connaught. Under James I thousands of
new settlers were introduced into Ulster from England and Scotland. Their descendants
prospered and the "Ulster problem" became a live issue in Irish politics. In 1920 the six
counties of Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh were grouped
together into the new state called northern Ireland. The three Ulster counties of
Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal form the province of Ulster in the Republic of Ireland.

22

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANICA 478 (1973).
6. J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 296

n.6.

7. Id. at 7.
8. P. BUCKLAND, ULSTER UNIONISM AND THE ORIGINS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 1886-1922, at
93 (1973).
9. Id. "Protestants outnumbered Catholics by substantial margins in Antrim, Down,
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On November 25, 1918, the British Parliament was dissolved.10
For the first time in English history, elections were scheduled for the
same day; polling day was to be December 14, 1918.11 The campaign
for the General Election opened during the final week of November. 2
The Manifesto of the Standing Committee of Sinn Fein as passed
by the Dublin Castle Censor provided in the first half:
The coming General Election is fraught with vital possibilities for the future of our nation. Ireland is faced with the
question whether this generation wills it that she is to march
out into the full sunlight of freedom, or is to remain in the
shadow of XXX imperialism
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXX
Sinn Fein aims at securing the establishment of that
Republic.
1. By withdrawing the Irish Representation from the British Parliament and by denying the right XXXXXX of the
British Government XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX to
legislate for Ireland.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
3. By the establishment of a constituent assembly comprising persons chosen by Irish constituencies as the supreme national authority to speak and act in the name of the Irish people, and to develop Ireland's social, political and industrial
life, for the welfare of the whole people of Ireland.
4. By appealing to the Peace Conference for the establishment of Ireland as an Independent Nation. At that conference
the future of the nations of the world will be settled on the
principle of government by consent of the governed. Ireland's
claim to the application of that principle in her favour is not
based on any accidental situation arising from the war. It is
older than many if not all of the present belligerents
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Armagh, and Londonderry; their stronghold was the city of Belfast, 75 percent of whose inhabitants were Protestants." J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 7.
10. D. MACARDLE, THE IRISH REPUBLIc 262 (1965).

11. G.

DANGERFIELD, THE DAMNABLE QUESTION:

A

STUDY IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS

300

(1976).

12. D.MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 262.
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Sinn Fein stands XXXXXXXXXXXXXX for the Nation;
it represents the old tradition of nationhood XXXXXX
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
reasserting the inalienable right of the Irish Nation to sovereign independence reaffirming the determination of the Irish
people to achieve it, and guaranteeing within the Independent
Nation equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens.
Believing that the time has arrived when Ireland's voice for
the principle of untrammelled XXXXXXXXXXXX self-determination should be heard above every interest of party or
class, Sinn Fein will oppose at the Polls every individual candidate who does not accept this principle. 1"
The drafting of this election manifesto had been a matter of
profound deliberation. 14 Even as passed by the Dublin Castle Censor, 15 it was plain what position the voters for Sinn Fein endorsed.

The Unionist vote in eight Ulster constituencies fell short of the
combined vote of Sinn Fein and the parliamentary United Irish
League (UIL) Nationalists. 6 An equal pre-election division of candidacies therein allocated to Sinn Fein the constituencies of Derry City,
East Down, Northwest Tyrone, and South Fermanagh, and to the
Nationalists, the constituencies of South Down, Northeast Tyrone,
East Donegal and South Armagh." The fledgling Irish Labour Party
decided not to contest the election. 8 Although the Party was displeased with Sinn Fein's social outlook, it chose to allow a clear popular expression on national self-determination.'
Sinn Fein worked under some extraordinarily adverse conditions.
The authorities censored Sinn Fein manifestos and arrested its director of elections.2 All republican papers had been suppressed and
every Irish newspaper was under censorship.2 Furthermore, the British controlled the entire election machinery and the Post Office.2
Forty-eight Sinn Fein candidates were jailed.23 Both the military and
the police watched the December 14th polling booths.2
13.
14.

Id. app. I, at 921 (The Xs indicate the censored portions).
Id. at 263.

15.

Id. "This election manifesto was mutilated by the British censor, about one-fourth of

its contents being deleted." Id.
16. Id. at 264. See also M. FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 21 (1976).
17. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 264-65.
18. J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 262.
22. Id.
23. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 300-01.
24. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 265.
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On the other hand, the polling clerks were almost exclusively Sinn
Fein.2" The lenient conditions of the Sinn Fein leadership's internment allowed them to direct Sinn Fein even post-arrest.2 6 Women
27
had secured the franchise, although not on terms of sexual equality.
Women over thirty were now eligible to vote, creating an infusion of
strength for Sinn Fein.28 The government so mismanaged the military vote that few Irish soldiers away from their units received postal
voting papers.2 9 In all probability they would have opposed Sinn Fein
as pro-German.30

B.

1918 Irish Self-Determination

Electoral results were announced on December 28, 1918.31 Of 105
candidates returned for Ireland, seventy-three were Sinn Feiners and
twenty-six were Unionists.3 2 The Nationalists retained six seats, s3
four of which resulted from a prior agreement requiring Sinn Fein to
withdraw from those constituencies. 34 Sinn Fein, with forty-seven
percent of ballots cast, 5 won a seventy percent majority of the
seats.3 6 The Irish total was 1,526,910 votes; the Unionists commanded
only 315,394 - about twenty percent.3 7
The measure of a people's will hinges upon the standard utilized.
Sinn Fein captured forty-seven percent of the popular vote with seventy-three percent of voters participating and twenty-seven percent
abstaining.3 8 Sinn Fein's victory was as substantial as that of the coalition in Britain, which resulted in a two-thirds majority in the House
of Commons with only 47.6 percent of the popular vote. 39 However,
25. W. PHILLIPS, THE REVOLUTION IN IRELAND 1906-1923, at 152 (1963).
26. Id.
27. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 262.
28. Id.
29. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 300.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 266.
32. See G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 300; D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 266; W.
PHILLIPS, supra note 25, at 153.
33. See J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 21; G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 300; D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 266.
34. See J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 21; M. FARRELL, supra note 16, at 21.
35. J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 21. "In the contested constituencies, slightly more than 1
million out of 1.5 million voters cast ballots. Sinn Fein got 484,000 of these votes, the Unionists
297,000, and the Home Rulers 233,000." Id. at 297 n.32.
36. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 266.
37. Id.
38. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 300-01. This percentage of voters was about average for Irish elections. Id.
39. J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 21.
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forty-one percent of the electorate failed to vote in this election.40
The British electorate had never awarded any English party as large
41
a majority in Great Britain as the Irish people had given Sinn Fein.
In nine-county Ulster, the Unionists won a popular majority in a
minority of the counties;"' Antrim, Derry, Down, and Armagh."' Not
only were the Unionists a minority in Tyrone and Fermanagh, but in
the remaining counties of Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan no Unionist at all was returned." The Unionists took only 265,111 votes in
Ulster to a combined Nationalist total of 177,557."5 In the six northeastern counties of Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, and
Tyrone, their local majority was 255,819 to 116,888. " Consequently,
the nationalist minority (one-third) in the six northeastern counties
far exceeded the Unionist minority (one-fifth) in all of Ireland."' On
balance, therefore, the 1918 elections apparently made out a poor
case for exclusion of the six counties. 8
The newly-elected Sinn Fein Members of Parliament (M.P.s) declined to go to Westminster. 9 Meeting at the Dublin Mansion House
on January 7, 1919, Sinn Fein representatives not incarcerated arranged to convene the Dail Eireann (Assembly of Ireland).50 All Irish
M.P.s were invited to attend but UIL members and Unionists refused. 5 1 The inaugural meeting of the Dail Eireann at the Mansion
House was on January 21, 1919, with the members adopting a Declaration of Independence. 2
The IRA, more or less under authority of the Dail Eireann,
opened a guerilla campaign against Britain.5 s From January 1919 until July 1921 Ireland was at war, which the Dail officially endorsed in
40. Id.
41. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 267. For readings of the 1918 General Election unfavorable to Sinn Fein, see IRISH UNIONISM 1885-1923, at 53, 56-57 (P. Buckland ed. 1973) (citing
generally J. WILSON, SELF-DETERMINATION (1921); P. WILSON. THE IRISH CASE 31-33 (1920)).
42. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 301.
43. D. MACARDLE, supra note 10, at 266.
44. Id.
45. M. FARRELL, supra note 16, at 21.
46. Id.
47. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 301.
48. Id.
49. M. FARRELL, supra note 16, at 22.
50. G. DANGERFIELD, supra note 11, at 301.
51. M. FARRELL, supra note 16, at 22.
52. Id.
53. C. O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 101. "The IRA, in continuous existence since 1916, is now
the world's oldest underground army. Even more telling is the fact that it is the last in an
almost unbroken succession of revolutionary organizations going back to Wolfe Tone's United
Irishmen." P. STEVENS, GOD SAVE IRELAND!: THE IRISH CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 194
(1974).
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March 1921. 64 Failing to crush the guerillas, Britain split Ulster.55
The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 established a Northern Ireland Parliament for the six northeastern counties of Antrim, Armagh,
Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone. The Unionists ultimately preferred these counties."
On June 22, 1921, King George V opened the inaugural session of
the Northern Ireland Parliament in Belfast by appealing for peac. 5 1
On July 9th a truce was agreed to, and on December 6, 1921, a treaty
was signed in London. 8 The twenty-six southern and western counties became a Commonwealth in 1922 and a Republic in 1948.11 British Prime Minister David Lloyd George encouraged the hope that a
Boundary Commission, created under this Anglo-Irish Treaty of
1921, would transfer to these independent counties at least the extensive Catholic areas included in Northern Ireland. e° Michael Collins, a
key Irish nationalist leader, believed this transfer would leave the remainder-statelet economically nonviable.6 1
C.

The Border as Gerrymander

Following the 1918 General Election the British and the Irish
Unionists had wrestled with the disposition of Ireland. In considering
partition, county lines usually became the political boundaries. 2 As
54. B. CHUBB, THE GOVERNMENT & POLITICS OF IRELAND 40 (1970).
55. Id.
56. C. O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 101. The Act of Ireland was "passed in the British Parliament in 1920 without one single Irish vote for or against it." O'Flaherty, Letter to the Editor,
NAT'L REV., May 13, 1977, at 527.
57. B. CHUBB, supra note 54, at 41.
58. Id.
59. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER 32 (1972).
60. C. O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 101.
61. Id.
If they join in, the Six counties will certainly have a generous measure of local autonomy.
If they stay out, the decision of the Boundary Commission arranged for in Clause 12,
would be certain to deprive "Ulster" of Fermanagh and Tyrone. Shorn of these counties,
she would shrink into insignificance. The burdens and financial restrictions of the Partition Act will remain on North-East Ulster if she decides to stay out. No lightening of
these burdens or restrictions can be effected by the English Parliament without the con-

sent of Ireland. Thus, union is certain.
M. COLLINS, THE PATH TO FREEDOM 93 (1922).
62. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 8, at 93. "Gerrymandering" has been defined as:

A reorganization of electoral districts to gain some advantage in a forthcoming election.
When Elbridge Gerry was Governor of Massachusetts in 1812, the state legislature divided Essex County into two districts with borders so drawn as to give the maximum
advantage to the RepublicanParty. On a map one of the districts, with pencilled additions, looked like a salamander, and the expression "to gerrymander" was coined. It

should be distinguished from the reorganization of electoral districts which is sometimes
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early as 1913-1914, then-British Prime Minister Asquith had considered partition by county option.63 By 1919 representatives of every
political allegiance advocated exclusion of all nine counties of Ulster,
a view attractive to Prime Minister George's government. 4 At the
last moment, however, the British government chose to exclude only
the six northeastern counties of Ireland. 5 This probably occurred because an anticipated six-county Parliament of fifty-two members
would boast a Unionist majority of about twenty.6
Advocates of nine-county Ulster rather farsightedly identified the
political unhealthiness of so unbalanced a breakdown. They feared
too large a Unionist majority in the northern Parliament as well as
too large a nationalist majority in the southern Parliament. Rather,
they favored a healthy Unionist minority in the south and nationalist
minority in the north, feeling the "proper" northern majority should
be effectuated as rapidly as possible.6
Six-county Unionists feared the united nine counties of Ulster because Protestants held a fifty-six percent majority. A nine-county
Parliament, including counties Cavan, Donegal, and Monaghan,
would rule therein only 70,000 Protestants and Unionists but 260,000
Catholics, Sinn Feiners and Nationalists. Advocates of a six-county
Ulster estimated that a united, nine-county Ulster Parliament would
yield a Unionist majority of three or four. 9 Indeed, the growth of the
socialist vote in and around Belfast imperiled even this slender
Unionist majority, possibly resulting in a Unionist minority of two."
Britain split both Ireland and Ulster along a religion-linked
essential to ensure that every parliamentary representative speaks for approximately the
same number of voters, and which is known as redistribution ...

F. ELLIOTT, A DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 190 (7th ed. 1973).
63.

J. CURRAN, supra note 3, at 7.

64. P. BuCKLAND, supra note 4, at 20.
65. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 8, at 117.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 119.

A majority of 20 in a parliament of 52 is rather large. It would appear unwise that the
northern parliament should have too great a unionist majority, just as it is to be deplored
that the southern parliament should have (and will have) too great a nationalistic majority, if it should contain any unionists at all. The ideal position would be to have a fairly
strong nationalist minority in the north and a fairly strong unionist minority in the
south. If this ideal position cannot at present be effected in the south it can and should
be in the north.
Id. (quoting Ulster and Home Rule. No Partitionof Ulster (pamphlet #D627/435 isssued Apr.
1920 by the Unionists of Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan, P.R.O.N.I.)).
68. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 4, at 20. This majority consisted of 890,880 non-Catholics to
690,819 Catholics. Id.
69. P. BUCKLAND, supra note 8, at 117.
70. Id. See also P. BUCKLAND, supra note 4, at 20. Advocates of a nine-county Ulster
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boundary line carefully geared to predetermine partisan electoral results. The Unionist leaders privately decided to settle for six counties
and abandon the other three Ulster counties which had a massive
Catholic majority. 71 The three counties excluded contained not only
70,000 Unionists but, more importantly, 260,000 Sinn Feiners and
Nationalists. Charles Craig, a key Irish Unionist leader, feared inclusion of these opponents would reduce the Unionist majority to an
untenable level.72
Britain divided Ireland not on Irish option, nor county option, nor
province-wide (Ulster-wide) option terms, but along a religion-linked
boundary line. One might inquire, therefore, what post-partition, sixcounty politics looked like. Paul Blanshard reported three decades
later that two of the six counties of the North, Fermanagh and
Tyrone, were Catholic and nationalist by only a narrow margin. The
Catholic-Protestant ratio in these two counties was about fifty-three
to forty-seven, and the nationalists had won a majority in every general election since 1920.11
Blanshard questioned whether the post-partition tension in the
six counties could be relieved if Fermanagh and Tyrone were ceded
to Dublin. He found cession of these two counties would leave unresolved the problem of Londonderry, Northern Ireland's second city,
which was predominantly Nationalist though located in a Unionist
county. Londonderry is only a few miles from the Republic's County
Donegal, to which it spiritually belongs. If the pattern of local allegiance either to Unionism or to Dublin was determinative in dividing
rejected all the arguments against a nine-counties parliament, especially the view that
the parties would be too finely balanced. Nine-counties men said that it was absurd to
imagine that a province with a Protestant majority of 200,064 should not be able to
return a majority of members, and they tried to prove that a nine-counties parliament
would contain a unionist majority by reference to past and future election results. On the
one hand, though no unionists had been returned for Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan in
the 1918 general election, 25 unionists and 15 Sinn Feiners and nationalists had been
returned for the whole province (whose parliamentary representation had been increased
from thirty-three to forty). On the other hand, under an Ulster parliament of 64 members elected by proportional representation, 38 unionists and 26 nationalists were likely
to be returned, including 2 unionists for the three-counties area. This would give unionists a good working majority and at the same time give adequate representation to the
Catholic minority.
P. BUCKLAND, supra note 8, at 118.
71. M. FARRELL, supra note 16, at 22.
72. "The three excluded counties contain some 70,000 Unionists and some 260,000 Sinn
Feiners and Nationalists, and the addition of that large bloc of Sinn Feiners and Nationalists
would reduce our majority to such a level that no sane man would undertake to carry on a
parliament with it." Id. at 366-67 n.2 (quoting Parliamentof the United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, 127 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 990-01 (Hansard 1920) (statement
of Charles Craig)).73. P. BLANSHARD, THE IRISH AND CATHOLIC POWER 218 (1972).
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Northern Ireland, the Republic would get not only the counties of
Tyrone and Fermanagh but also the City of Londonderry and the
sections known as South Armagh and South Down. The Dublin Irish
Catholic advocated the right of these sections to secede from the
Unionist-ruled statelet because of their nationalist majorities. If they
did, however, Blanshard realized almost nothing would remain of
Northern Ireland except for Belfast and its environs.74
As previously noted, in 1921 Michael Collins clearly anticipated
Blanshard's 1953 observations. Too few people from the six-county
area favored partition along a religion-linked boundary line carefully
geared to predetermine partisan electoral results. The six-county partition border endorsed by Charles Craig was and is recognized as a
religion-linked, political gerrymander. 75 If majority rule self-determination remains the justification for Irish partition, then analysts
must properly assess the legitimacy of calculated religion-linked political gerrymandering.
D.

Democracy and Gerrymandering

1. A European Juridical Perspective
One commentator has described the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
among the greatest achievements of the Council of Europe. 76 Europeans may now bring before the European Commission of Human
Rights (Commission) allegations of human rights violations. By 1980,
fourteen of the nineteen contracting states had accepted the optional
declaration allowing individuals' petitions.77
Protocol One of the Convention provides in Article 3: "The High
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. ''7 Article 14 of the Convention provides: "The enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other
74.

Id. at 218-19.

75. McEvoy, Letter to the Editor, CHRISTIAN SCI.
76.

R.

BEDDARD,

MONITOR,

Feb. 17, 1982, at 22, col. 2.

A STUDY OF THE MACHINERY OF HUMAN
1 (1980) (author is Lecturer in Law at the

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE:

RIGHTS PROTECTION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

University of Southhampton).
77. Id. (21 countries are members of the Council).
78. Protocol One of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, reprinted in R. BEDDARD, supra note 76, at 204.
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status.""9
The 1979 Commission case, Kennedy Lindsay et al. v. United
Kingdom,8 0 is instructive as to the democratic legitimacy of religionlinked political gerrymanders carefully geared to predetermine electoral results. In Kennedy, the applicants, officers of the British
Ulster Dominion Party, protested the United Kingdom's European
Assembly Elections Act of 1978. This enactment specified that the
elections of U.K. representatives to the European Assembly must
utilize the simple majority system of voting in the U.K. outside the
six counties of Northern Ireland. However, within Northern Ireland
the elections must utilize the proportional representation system of
the single transferable vote."1 The applicants were dissatisfied with
the prospect of proportional representation for "the Irish Republican
8' 2
irredentist community.
The Commission determined that Article 3 of the Protocol provides for elections ensuring free expression of the people's opinion.
Proportional representation affords minority views to be adequately
represented particularly where, as in Northern Ireland, votes are normally cast along ethnic or religious lines and a clear minority group
exists. The Commission found this system more protective of minority rights and, therefore, consistent with the Protocol's goal of free
expression in elections.8 "
If proportional representation is generally in keeping with democratic politics, what of gerrymanders? Gerrymandering supposes the
drawing of some electoral lines unnecessary under proportional representation. In Liberal Party v. United Kingdom, " the Commission,
in interpreting Article 14 of the Convention, denied that the U.K.
Liberal Party had suffered a violation of its rights in the system of
U.K. parliamentary elections from simple majority electoral dis79. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, reprinted in R. BEDDARD, supra note 76, at 189.
80. No. 8364/78, 15 Decisions and Reports 247 (European Comm'n on Human Rights,
Mar. 8, 1979).
81. Id. at 248.
82. Id. at 249.
83. Id. at 251. The Commission further stated:

[T]he Commission cannot find that the application of a system more favourable to the
minority in this part of the country is not in line with the condition that the people
should be able to express its opinion freely. Rather on the contrary, a system taking into
account the specific situation as to majority and minority existing in Northern Ireland
must be seen as making it easier for the people to express its opinion freely.
Id.
84. No. 8765/79, 21 Decisions and Reports 211 (European Comm'n on Human Rights,
Dec. 18, 1980).
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tricts.8 5 Yet, it left "open the question whether . . . specific features
in the voting behavior could raise an issue under Article 3 of the Protocol, also in conjunction with Article 14, if religious or ethnic groups
could never be represented because there was a clear voting pattern
along these lines in the majority ....
""
The Northern Ireland border is a gerrymander engineering specific features into voting behavior. An identifiable religious group
cannot win because a clear voting pattern along religious lines exists
in the intra-six county electoral majority. Article 3 of the Protocol
and Article 14 of the Convention may provide assistance in determining whether the Northern Ireland border as gerrymander has afforded democratically legitimate majority rule self-determination. To
the extent one-person/one-vote principles illegitimize gerrymanders
along religious lines, the Northern Ireland border as calculated gerrymander is illegitimate.

2.

An American Juridical Perspective

The gerrymander issue was recently addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Davis v. Bandemer 7 Once Justice White,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, determined
that a political gerrymandering claim can be justiciable,"8 he turned
his attention to the question of whether gerrymandering is a provable
violation of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws to every person within the jurisdiction of a state. 9
The precise question was "whether a particular group has been
unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process."9 0 The four Justices found the lack of proportional representation insufficient to prove discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment."1 Justice White further stated
without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot presume
in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the
disproportionately underrepresented group. Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system
is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a
85. Id. at 213, 225. See also X v. United Kingdom, No. 7140/75, 7 Decisions and Reports
95 (European Comm'n on Human Rights, Oct. 8, 1976).
86. No. 8765/79, 21 Decisions and Reports at 225.
87. 54 U.S.L.W. 4898 (U.S. June 24, 1986).
88. Id. at 4903.
89. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
90. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4905.
91. Id.
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voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process
as a whole. 2
Justice White's logic is applicable to the British drawing of a
1922-1987 gerrymander borderline across the island map of Ireland.
Revolutionary Ireland constituted an island in contest for self-determination purposes. The border arrangement, however, has created an
electoral system which "consistently degrade[s] . . .a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."9 3
Nationalist voters ("a group of voters") in Northern Ireland have
found their aspirations permanently discounted ("consistently degrade[d]"). The frontier has for four generations denied these voters
a voice in the nationalist Dublin government by including inside
Northern Ireland such nationalist populations of the nine-county
province of Ulster as Londonderry and the counties of Tyrone and
Fermanagh."" The border also has denied those four generations their
chance to effectively "influence . . . the political process" inside
Northern Ireland by excluding therefrom such nationalist populations of Ulster as the counties of Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan. 5
Under the standard expressed in Davis,9 6 the Northern Ireland border is clearly illegitimate.
The gerrymander border climax of the 1918-1922 struggle is particularly relevant to 1987 Irish unification demands, provided the
1923-1987 Northern Ireland demography is approximately as
favorable to nationalist unification demands as the 1918-1922 demography. This would suggest the continuing impact of the original gerrymander. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the demography of
Northern Ireland.

III.
A.

THE POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF DEMOGRAPHY ISSUE

The Perpetually Impending Catholic Majority

Since 1861 the religious distribution in the Northern Ireland sixcounties has been remarkably stable notwithstanding the higher
birthrate of the local Catholics.9 7 Even allowing for age, age at marriage, and occupation, the birthrates of the local Catholics are higher
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
See supra text accompanying note 92.
Kane, Civil Rights in Northern Ireland, 33 REV. POL. 54, 73 (1971).
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than those of other denominations."
Paul Blanshard in 1953 found allegations that the Catholic birthrate in Northern Ireland had been double the Protestant rate in the
1940's. 9 The North's educational statistics showed that forty-one
percent of the primary schoolchildren were Catholic, although the
Catholic proportion of the total populace was about thirty-four percent. 100 If this superior nationalist population rate of reproduction
continued, Blanshard predicted that within a few decades Northern
Ireland would be absorbed into othe. Aepublic. In 1987 Mr. Blanshard's 1953 speculation, "a few decades," ' sounds like now.
By 1972 Northern Ireland's Catholics apparently constituted an
absolute majority always impending but never allowed to arrive. The
greater Catholic birthrate had been, since the formation of Northern
Ireland as a separate statelet, an ever-present subject of Unionist
warnings to the Protestant population. The Unionists have utilized
this constant fear of being outbred to summon both Protestant employers and workers to exert economic pressure to drive Catholics
from the area. The chief function of recurrent sectarian riots and
pogroms 0 2 in Belfast is doubtlessly to expel Catholics whenever the
pressure of their numbers increased. The extent of the peril which
causes the Protestants' consistent apprehension regarding their ascendancy is indicated by the fact that the number of Catholic children of schoolgoing age is nearly always half that of the total of such
children. According to Terence O'Neill, then-Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland, in 1969 the proportion of Catholic children was
fifty-one percent. Of course, by 1987 this generation of schoolchildren
is well into voting age.
Only through the operation of selective pressures, mainly economic, have the Protestants kept relatively stable the percentage of
Catholics in the overall populace. The Catholic percentage has shown
a tendency to mount slowly: in 1911, 34.4 percent; in 1926, 33.5 percent; in 1937, 33.5 percent; in 1951, 34.4 percent; and in 1961, 34.9
percent." 3 By 1971 the overall Catholic proportion had slipped to
31.4 percent, 0 4 yet in mid-1981 the Catholic birthrate remained
98.
99.

Id. at 74.
P. BLANSHARD, supra note 73, at 232.

1OO. Id.
101. Id.
102.

This Yiddish word is defined as "an organized massacre of helpless people ....
(5th ed. 1977).
103. L. DE PAOR, DIVIDED ULSTER 129 (1973).
104. THE ULSTER YEAR BOOK: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK OF NORTHERN IRELAND 1977, at 10
(Belfast). On the other hand, the proportion of Northern Irish marriages overall which were
Catholic actually increased steadily over the 1961, 1971, 1976, 1977 and 1978 dates from 33.3
per cent (1961) to 40.2 per cent (1978). THE ULSTER YEAR BOOK: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK OF
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 887
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higher than the Protestant.'
Another analyst reviewed the evidence finding in 1974 the Roman
Catholics' fertility rates were considerably higher than for all other
groups. Live births by 1000 married women in 1960-1962 were 288 for
the former but 163 for the latter group, and the respective averages
for family size were 4.69 and 2.88. The fertility differential between
the two groups became significant only post-1937, and the effect
thereof can be witnessed in the mounting number of Catholic children in primary schools. These percentages were 34.8 percent in
1924, 36.5 percent in 1934, 39.4 percent in 1945, 42.8 percent in 1951,
45.5 percent in 1957, and 51 percent in 1968.'06
In 1982 reports surfaced, only days prior to the outbreak of the
Anglo-Argentinian Falkland Islands War, that apparently 1978 was
the initial year in which more children had been born to Catholic
than to Protestant parents. The Roman Catholic Church recorded
13,286 baptisms in 1978, a year of 26,239 births.'07
Paul Compton, a geography professor at Belfast's Queen's University studying population trends, recounted that by 1982, while the
Protestant birthrate was only fourteen per thousand, the Catholic
was twenty-one per thousand. The Protestant death rate was virtually equal to its birthrate at thirteen per thousand, whereas the death
rate of the progressively younger Catholic populace reached just nine
per thousand. 0 8 Although answers to census questions about religion
are voluntary and many persons withhold any response, Compton estimated the Catholic element had attained thirty-eight percent of the
six-county population even by 1979.108
B. Emigration as Political Weapon
Blanshard discovered that Northern Ireland Catholics were certainly reproducing faster than Protestants, but apparently not all of
them were remaining in Northern Ireland." As previously indicated,
the Northern Ireland Catholic absolute majority is always imminent
1980, Table 17 (Belfast); THE ULSTER YEAR BOOK: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK
OF NORTHERN IRELAND 1981, Table 16 (Belfast).
105. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, The Irish Problem, NAT'L REV., June 26, 1981, at 728.
106. G. MAcEoIN, NORTHERN IRELAND: CAPTIVE OF HISTORY 11 (1974). The percentages
through 1957 were gleaned from M. HESLINGA, THE IRISH BORDER AS A CULTURAL DIVIDE 64
(1971). See G. MACEOIN, supra, at 302 n.7. The 1968 figure was originally supplied by O'Neill.
See id. (citing The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland, in THE PLAIN TRUTH 2
(3d ed. 1972)).
107. Borders, Ulster Seems Headed for a Catholic Majority, in NORTHERN IRELAND 137,
138 (J. Bartlett ed. 1983) (reprinted in N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 10, col. 1).
108. Id. at 138.
109. Id.
110. P. BLANSHARD, supra note 73, at 232.
NORTHERN IRELAND
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but never achieved due in large part to differential emigration.
The total percentage of emigration from Northern Ireland between 1951 and 1961 was 10.1 percent for Roman Catholic males, although only 4.5 percent for males of other denominations. For Roman Catholic females it was 8.8 percent, while for females of other
denominations just 3.0 percent. The severe impact of Roman Catholic emigration is more evident in the figures from two important age
groups. In the age group twenty to twenty-four, 28.6 percent of Roman Catholic males left, compared to just 9.5 percent of other denominations. In the age group twenty-five to twenty-nine, 31.7 percent of Roman Catholic males departed, but only 19.3 percent of
other denominations. Female emigration parallels that of males, although the percentages are somewhat lower. Recall that persons of
other denominations outnumber Catholics about two to one, so the
Catholic emigration on this basis is quite high.1 11
The importance of Protestant emigration from the twenty-six
counties of independent Ireland also cannot be exaggerated. A
twenty-four percent Protestant decrease from 1926 to 1946 created a
concurrent decline in the total population in independent Ireland
when an increase normally would have occurred.' 1 2 But this pattern
of comparatively heavier Protestant emigration from the south reversed after World War II. Between 1946 and 1961 the Catholic intercensal decline was greater for specific age groups. 1
Moreover, official selective emigration pressures were absent in independent Ireland. As one demographer's study found, the emergence of modern Ireland during the early 1920's, and the Protestant
populace's decline by one-third from 1911 to 1926, were not linked in
any way to the new government's direct discrimination against Protestants. In the Irish Free State's Constitution of 1922, the state specifically was prohibited from endorsing any one religion; imposing
any discrimination or disability because of religious affiliation; or acquiring church property by compulsion, except for certain specified
public works and then only with compensation. Protestant schools
continued sans interference, and had special transportation facilities.
The judiciary retained the more than representative proportion of
Protestants. Under the 1937 Constitution, the first President of Ireland was a Protestant, Douglas Hyde."' The Northern Ireland case is
111. Kane, supra note 97, at 74 (citing B. WALSH, RELIGION AND DEMOGRAPHIc BEHAVIOR
IN IRELAND 17 (1969)).
112. R. KENNEDY, THE IRISH: EMIGRATION, MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY 110 (1975). Protestant
emigration rather than conversion to Catholicism appears the active variable. Id. at 111.
113. Id. at 116. These age groups are 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34. Id.
114. Id. at 128. Protestants in independent Ireland have constituted a privileged minority. K. BOWEN, PROTESTANTS IN A CATHOLIC STATE: IRELAND'S PRIVILEGED MINORITY (1983).
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not to be confused with the Ireland-wide state of affairs.
C.

Selective Emigration Pressures

It is important to determine what causes this differential emigration which precludes arrival of the ever-impending Catholic absolute
majority in Northern Ireland. Coincidentally with the 1969 revitalization of the current strife in Northern Ireland, one commentator recorded that the Northern Ireland government in Belfast and various
local authorities were perhaps the biggest employers in the region.' 5
These employers invariably hired Protestants. "' During 1967 out of
106 public service positions paying over £4,000 yearly, only three
were held by Catholics. 1 7 Over ninety percent of the six-county
Northern Ireland civil servants were Protestant."' As of 1969, 209
professional and technical grade government employees existed, ranging from cabinet officers to Parliamentary draughtsmen. Only thirteen employees were Catholic. 19
The noted Insight Team of The Sunday Times discerned the rationale underlying Northern Ireland governmental employment discrimination against Catholics: Catholics were enemies of the state. 20
If their superior birthrate were not countered by the frank persuasions to emigrate, they would become a majority throughout the
province and promptly vote it into the Catholic Republic to the
south. ' l
As United States Senator Daniel P. Moynihan commented during his earlier incarnation as
a professional sociologist:
The Irish resistance to British rule provided, along with the Polish experience in yet
more complicated circumstances, a model of sorts for the colonial wars of liberation that
have taken up so much of modern history. One could wish that those who [have] followed, or repeated, the model might have gone on to learn from the Irish how to establish a democratic society in the aftermath of colonial rule.

Moynihan, Foreward, in A. GREELEY,

THAT MOST DISTRESSFUL NATION vii, xv (1972). A sociologist might inquire what, if any, potent sociocultural variable is common to Poland and the
Republic of Ireland.
Electoral politics remained religion-linked in Northern Ireland but not in independent Ireland due partly to the use of single-member constituencies in the north but proportional representation in the Republic. E. LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE 255 (1974). For a prominent
study of Irish voting, see generally C. O'LEARY, IRISH ELECTIONS, 1918-77 (1979).
115. A. BESTIC, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IRISH 175 (1969).
116. Id.

117. D.

CONNERY, THE IRISH

259 (1968).

118. Id.
119. Kane, supra note 97, at 60-61 (citing The Campaign for Social Justice in Northern
Ireland, in THE PLAIN TRUTH 5-6 (2d ed. 1969)).
120. THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 55, at 30.
121. Id.
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As of 1969 a large number of firms opening factories in Northern
Ireland located in predominantly Protestant areas.'2 2 Adult male unemployment in Protestant areas was 1.0 percent for Antrim, 3.6 percent for Ballymena, 3.6 percent in Lisburn, and 4.1 percent in Bangor. Corresponding unemployment in Catholic areas was 17.1 percent
in Derry, 17.5 percent in Newry, 20.6 percent in Enniskillen, and 24.1
percent in Strabane.1' The 1971 male unemployment rates indicate
4
the continuing disparity between Catholics and Protestants."1
There seems no purely economic explanation for these Northern
Ireland Protestant/Catholic unemployment differentials. Overall unemployment figures were almost identical for the Northern Ireland
six counties and the twenty-six independent Ireland counties. In 1966
the Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland unemployment percentages
were 6.1 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively; in 1971 they were 8.1
25
percent and 8.0 percent, respectively.1
122. A. BESTIC, supra note 115, at 175.
123. Id. The British government is well aware that its economic manipulation of Northern Ireland disfavors Catholics and reinforces bigotry. Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson's
memoirs quote with approval his televised May 1974 speech on Northern Ireland: "On finance,
we had provided $70 million for the Harland and Wolff Shipyard, 'where the employment is
almost 100 per cent from a single religious community.' Yet it was Harland workers who more

than any had denied their fellow Ulstermen the right to work." H.
LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1974-1976, at 77 (1979).

WILSON, FINAL TERM: THE

"Of over one thousand skilled workers at the Harland and Wolfe Shipyard there is not one
skilled Catholic tradesman - a fact that did not stop the British government from recently
giving Harland and Wolfe over $100 million to continue its operations of both shipbuilding and
discrimination." Lowry, Keeping Catholics in Their Place, COMMONWEAL, July 16, 1982, at 400,
401 (emphasis in original).
124. The 1971 male unemployment rates are as follows:
District Council

Catholic

Protestant

Castlereagh
(East Belfast)
Lisburn
Newtownabbey
Antrim
Ballymena
Carrickfergus
Lame
Craigavon

15.3

4.6

8.3
11.3
9.0
10.1
11.8
9.6
14.3

4.3
4.7
3.5
6.2
6.3
4.7
5.1

O'Dowd, Regional Policy, in L. O'DowD, B. ROLSTON & M.

TOMLINSON, NORTHERN IRELAND

30,

57 (1980).
125. T. O'HANLON, THE IRISH 241 (1975). More recent data demonstrates that the British
government's 1976 Fair Employment Act, supposedly enacted to curb anti-Catholic employment discrimination in Northern Ireland, has failed. Lowry, supra note 123, at 400-01. Queen's
University (Belfast) claims to be a center of excellence, but in 1982-1983 it had but 55 Catholic,
full-time, academic staff members, as opposed to 286 Protestant. It also had 7 Catholic professors versus 34 Protestant. Four to One Imbalance in Queen's Academics, FORTNIGHT, Oct. 1986,
at 5.
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Official social pressure as well as economic pressures may have
helped impel differential emigration. In 1972 Prime Minister O'Neill
published a book entitled, The Autobiography of Terence O'Neill:
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 1963-1969.126 It included a photograph of Prime Minister O'Neill captioned: "The first ever visit of
a Northern Ireland Prime Minister to a Catholic school. 1 27 Notice
the significant irony of the first visit being so recent.
Law enforcement authorities also could invoke pressures other
than economic and social in Northern Ireland to ensure that an always impending Catholic absolute majority is permanently forestalled via differential emigration. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 12 8 In the 1972 case of Government of Ireland v. Government of the United Kingdom, 2 " the Dublin government, applicant, charged the London government,
respondent, with use of torture techniques in Northern Ireland. The
record described in detail the British government's interrogation
techniques.1 30 The Commission found the purpose of these methods
to be isolation of the person "not only from communicating with
other persons, but also from himself."13 1 The Commission held the
British tactics violative of Article 3.132 Although it found the United
Kingdom had presently ceased these methods, the Commission recognized the very real possibility of their re-introduction. In fact, the
British government "reserved to itself the right to re-introduce
them. 1 33 An historical analysis of respondent's behavior with other
126. T. O'NEILL, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF TERENCE O'NEILL: PRIME MINISTER OF NORTHERN
IRELAND 1963-1969 (1972).
127. Id. at 66-67.
128. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3, reprinted in R. BEDDARD, supra note 76, at 184.
129. No. 5310/71, 41 Decisions and Reports 3 (European Comm'n on Human Rights, Oct.
1, 1972).
130.
IT]he applicant Government described the forms and effects of the previously authorized
techniques. As regards wall-standing, the persons who were being interrogated were kept
in an uncomfortable posture with the tips of their fingers against the wall for long periods. Their heads were hooded and they were deprived of sleep and food. They were also
subjected to what the psychiatrists described as a "white noise" which was a continuing
noise with the object of producing a sense of isolation in the victim as well as hallucinations. The hooding also produced a sense of isolation and disorientation and, it was
claimed, in some cases a sense of panic or suffocation.
Id. at 55.
131. Id. (citing a report by Professor J. Bastiaans of Leyden University).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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cultures supported the applicant's fears of re-introduction.' 3 " The
Commission, therefore, found "appropriate and timely" new limits on
permissible forms of interrogation." 5
With the widely-experienced forces of law and order in Northern
Ireland performing their avowed peacekeeping function in this manner, some elements of the populace may have conceivably lost confidence in the regime. Furthermore, this data could help explain the
belief, deeply-held by Argentine soldiers in 1982 in the Falkland Islands, that they would be tortured by their British captors. 36
134.
[T]hese interrogation procedures had been used in Malaya, Palestine, Kenya and Cyprus
where they had similarly been discontinued until they were required again. Thus, they
had been used again in the British Cameroons (1960-61), Brunei (1963), British Guiana
(1964), Aden (1964-67), Borneo/Malaysia (1965-66), the Persian Gulf (1970-71) and in
Northern Ireland.
Id. (citing the Parker Report).
135. Id.
The report of the Compton Committee in November 1971 confirmed that a selected
number of suspects arrested in the internment operation had been subjected to what was
called "interrogation in depth" over periods of up to five days. This involved subjecting
the suspects to prolonged periods of interrogation interspersed with prolonged periods of
wallstanding and other debilitating exercises; suspects were also deprived of food and
sleep, hooded and exposed to continuous monotonous noise. There is little doubt that
most were also subjected to repeated beatings though the precise extent of this was not
established by the Compton Committee. The purposes of these "five techniques," as they
came to be called, was clearly to break down the resistance of the suspects so that they
would reveal all that they knew of terrorist organization and activity. They had been
developed by the Army in its operations in Malaya, Kenya and Aden and appear to have
been passed on to the RUC Special Branch, though the precise responsibility for their
introduction has still not been clarified.
K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LEGAL CONTROL OF
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 37 (1980) (citing Report of the inquiry into allegations against the security
forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th of August 1971,
Cmnd. 4823, HMSO (London), 1971 (Compton Report)).
136. The official British overseas torture in Northen Ireland, the Cameroons, Brunei,
British Guinea, Aden, Borneo/Malaysia and the Persian Gulf appears to have been recalled
vividly during the 1982 Falkland Islands War. British newsman Jeremy Hands accompanied
the British assault force on Goose Green:
The Argentine commanders had evidently told their men that the British would torture
and kill them if they gave up. "When they found out that that was not going to be the
case the relief on their faces was incredible to see," said Hands. "One of them burst into
tears and many of them fell on their knees and began to pray."
Whitaker, Came, Stanger & Sethi, The Falklands End Game, TIME, June 14, 1982, at 48, 51.
An early reliance on pro-British sources was necessary since even in mid-July 1982 foreign journalists were "normally excluded from the recaptured islands." Henry, A Double Standard for
Israel?, TIME, July 12, 1982, at 51.
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D. The Welfare-PurchasedLoyalty Defense
Some commentators argue that the bulk of Northern Ireland's
Catholic population prefers union with Britain over entry of the six
counties into the Republic of Ireland because the Northern Ireland
welfare state is more generous than that of the Republic. '3 7 Yet the
welfare state is a tool that can be unleashed against an electoral minority which the electoral majority hopes to discourage from
reproducing.
Consider the events of 1956. The Westminster government in that
year increased family allowances and introduced a differentiation between the second child and subsequent children. A larger allowance
was thereby paid for each child after the second. The Northern Ireland government, in introducing parallel legislation, revised the increase to operate the differentiation in reverse. Larger allowances
were made for the second and third children, with smaller allowances
for subsequent ones. Catholics pointed out that this departure from
the Westminster formula was discriminatory, and many Unionists
objected that it was a dangerous departure from the step-by-step policy. During June a Presbyterian General Assembly's resolution supported the Catholic complaint that the proposal could be read as intentional political discrimination against them. The resolution called
on the government to fall into line with the English scheme. Thereafter, the government retreated, and preserved the step-by-step
principle.138
This argument is also circular. Justifying rule over an electoral
minority through that minority's endorsement purchased with welfare would be unnecessary had the electoral majority not already
ruled to prevent minority self-sufficiency. In other words, the British
discriminatory rule created Catholic poverty which necessitated
Catholic welfare dependency leading to Catholic acquiescence again
perpetuating the British discriminatory rule.
Furthermore, some question arises whether, under democratic
principles, majority rule self-determination truly exists where an incumbent regime has a friendly popular "majority" merely through
political manipulation of local demography. The renowned scholar
Alfred Cobban addressed this issue in 1919, during the same diplomatic era as the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921.139 His discussion concerned the plight of the native French inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. Actual self-determination by these people was impossible
137.
138.

T. O'HANLON, supra note 125, at 238-43.
L. DE PAOR, supra note 103, at 129-30.

139. A. COBBAN,

THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
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because large numbers had emigrated while an almost equal number
of Germans immigrated to the area. Many viewed plebiscitary selfdetermination under these circumstances impossible. 14 0 Cobban
observed:
There was a reasonable argument behind this position. Can a
state, it might well have been asked, annex territory inhabited by members of another nationality, remove large numbers of them by open or veiled pressure, or merely by the operation of their desire not to live under an alien government,
introduce in their place its own nationals, and then claim
the territory on the basis of self-determination? Such a consideration suggests41 the need of qualifying the use of the plebiscitary method.'

A comparison to self-determination difficulties in Northern Ireland is
inevitable. Britain now rules the territory of Northern Ireland after
having removed the possibility of a Catholic absolute majority actually emerging either by "open or veiled pressure, or merely by a minority's desire not to live under an alien government.""' 2 Britain
therefore claims the territory on the basis of self-determination. As
recently as 1982, however, the Thatcher administration apparently
denied that any state legitimately can claim territory on the basis of
self-determination through annexation, removal of inhabitants, and
subsequent introduction of its nationals. The Thatcher government
at that time seemed to agree that, under democratic principles, an
incumbent regime cannot create majority rule self-determination
through political manipulation of local demography.
The Anglo-Argentinian conflict illustrates in reverse British recognition of the difficulties in plebiscitary self-determination. Noel Annan revealed that, in the Spring 1982 Anglo-Argentinian negotiations
140.

Id. at 72-73.

The French claimed Alsace-Lorraine on historic grounds and some doubt was felt
"whether 'self-determination' in the shape of a plebescite would give a clear majority for
re-union with France." A French writer of the time put the difficulty bluntly: "At this
moment in Alsace-Lorraine," he said, "any referendum would be meaningless." It has
been estimated that about half a million French had left the conquered provinces between 1871 and 1910, and some 300,000 Germans had come in to take their place, a
sufficient proportion of the whole population to produce at least an unpleasantly large
minority vote for Germany in a plebiscite. Significantly, the Allies [and Britain was an
Ally], in their reply to the German protest stressed the popular opposition to the annexation by Germany in 1871, rather than the sentiments of the population in 1919.

Id. Political scientist Lawrence T. Farley made a similar point just last year. L. FARLEY,
SCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY 54-55, 96-98 (1986).
141.
142.

A. COBBAN, supra note 139, at 72-73 (emphasis added).
See id.
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over the Falkland Islands, the Argentinian proviso most upsetting to
the British was that, upon withdrawal of the Argentinian troops,
their nationals should be free to reside and work on the islands. 3
Since Argentina invaded the islands while negotiations were in progress, the British no longer accepted Argentinian good faith. They
believed the proviso proved the Argentinians had determined to flood
the islands with their nationals and thereby "make any referendum
go their way."""'
In Northern Ireland the incumbent rulers have ensured, through
the political-economic manipulation of the local demography, that
"any referendum [can] go their way" in the face of a continually impending, yet permanently thwarted, native Catholic Northern Ireland
absolute majority. 45 Note how closely this Northern Ireland reality
corresponds to the future of the Falkland Islands as allegedly anticipated by Argentina but repudiated by the Thatcher Administration.
In 1982 London supported political manipulation of demography to
reinforce British incumbency in Northern Ireland but not to erode
British incumbency in the Falkland Islands.
143. Annan, Mrs. Thatcher's Case, N.Y. REV. BooKs, July 15, 1982, at 20, 21-22. Annan is
a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of London.
144. Id. There is evidence that France has manipulated the demography of New Caledonia to keep the nationalistic Kanaks (the indigenous Melanesian people) an artificial minority
in their own country, and so has perpetuated French overseas imperialism. Martin, France's
Headache in South Pacific, INSIGHT, Feb. 16, 1987, at 38, 39. In August 1986, the South Pacific
Forum called for "reinscription" of New Caledonia on the United Nations' list of non-selfgoverning territories, thereby placing the matter under the supervision of the U.N. Committee
on Decolonization. Id. at 38. Should international pressure ultimately press France from New
Caledonia notwithstanding an artifically evoked pro-French local majority, that precedent
would tend to favor British withdrawal from Ireland notwithstanding an artifically evoked proBritish local majority.
145. "In the fiscal year 1971-72, per capita public expenditure on social services in the
North was 91 percent higher than in the Republic." T. O'HANLON, supra note 125, at 239.
In March 1973 voters were offered two propositions: to remain part of the United Kingdom or to be joined with the Republic of Ireland. The result was 591,820 in favor of the
link with Britain, 6,463 for amalgamation with the Republic. A great number of Catholic
voters abstained, or or were prevented from voting by intimidation. Had all the Catholics
voted, the majority would still have preferred the link with Britain. And for good economic reasons. However poor a Northern Ireland worker is - the average worker there
earns 15% less than his counterpart in Britain - he is more affluent than the average
worker in the Republic.
Id. Lord Longford, member of the Harold Wilson cabinet from 1964 to 1968 (during which time
he was Leader of the House of Lords, Lord Privy Seal, and Colonial Secretary), and A. McHardy of The Guardian find this vote "of little value." Of the total electorate only 58 percent

favored the BritiSh link. F.

LONGFORD

& A. McHARDY,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/1
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IV. CONCLUSION

A.

Self-Determination in Northern Ireland

The foregoing discussion suggests that an Irish nationalist rather
than a Unionist outcome is possibly politically appropriate upon application of the democratic standard to Northern Ireland. Irish and
Ulster division by Britain, as the frustration of majority rule self-determination, is arguably vulnerable to criticism upon two bases: the
gerrymander principle, and the policy of political manipulation of local demography.
One commentator, in support of Irish unification, observed that
the six northeastern counties of Ireland (i.e., Northern Ireland) suffer
the plight which the six northeastern states of the United States
(New England) would endure if an overseas sovereign, like Britain,
ruled them.'46 Under those circumstances, resistance would be politi7
cally justified.

14

This analogy has elicited the rejoinder that in fact such "states,"
meaning Canada, exist which are loosely affiliated with England. Like
the local majority in part of Ulster which refuses to join an Irish republic, the Canadians refuse to join an American republic. To the
question of whether anyone forcing Canadians into an American republic through bombing would be a thug, the answer supposedly is
obvious."'
The question arises whether Northern Ireland is more like the
contemporary Canadian monarchy or the hypothetical British-ruled,
embattled New England. Britain needs no overseas army at war with
Canadians to retain the Queen as a link between the two monarchies.
However, Britain requires an overseas army at war with Irish men
and women" 9 to protract its domain over Northern Ireland.150
Michael Collins, the Irish nationalist champion of the Anglo-Irish
Treaty of 1921, observed:
So long as there are British troops in Ireland so long will the
Orangemen [Northern Ireland Unionists] hold out. While they
can look to Britain they will not turn towards the South. They
are not giving up their ascendancy without a struggle. Any
Irishman who creates and supports division amongst us is
standing in the way of a united Ireland. While the Treaty is
146.
147.
148.

O'Flaherty, Letter to the Editor, NAT'L REV., Oct 29, 1976, at 1157.
Id.
Cunningham, Letter to the Editor, NAT'L REV., Dec. 10, 1976, at 1318.
149. See generally M. McGumE, To TAKE ARMS: A YEAR IN THE PROVISIONAL IRA (1973)
(memoir of Maria McGuire).
150. O'Flaherty, supra note 56, at 527.
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threatened the British will remain. While the British remain
the North-East will keep apart. Just as the evil British policy
of divide and rule is about to end for ever, we are threatened
with a new division, jeopardising the hopes of Irish rule. '
Even such authority in favor of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 illustrates that contemporary Northern Ireland is more like the hypothetical British-occupied New England than unoccupied contemporary
Canada. An overseas army dispatched to subdue a local populace is
the distinguishing factor.
To be more precise in distinguishing Canada from Northern Ireland, Canadian nationalism is a variable independent of any overseas
British army. No overseas British army must be factored into the Canadian political equation to sustain a local majority of Canadians
choosing to be politically separate from the United States. If Canada
were threatened by unpopular unification with America, British
troops dispatched to hold the Canadian border would merely constitute a military variable dependent upon the independent variable of
Canadian nationalism.
Conversely, in Northern Ireland the British military factor is the
independent variable upon which depends the so-called majority resistance to unification with the twenty-six counties depends. This
corresponds to Collins' view: "While the British remain the NorthEast will keep apart. 1 51 Collins' point has elicited emotional, indeed

bloody, hostility spanning several generations. But opponents of Collins' hypothesis seem unwilling to put it to the test.
If the independent variable, the British army, is factored out of
the Northern Ireland equation, then the dependent variable, the socalled majority resistance to unification with the twenty-six counties,
could also be factored out. Collins found that as long as British
troops remain, the unification foes will not turn towards the twentysix counties. "They [will] not [give] up their ascendancy without a
struggle."'1 53
Political reappraisal of the democratic legitimacy or illegitimacy
of British rule over Northern Ireland is particularly timely during
151.

M.

COLLINS,

supra note 57, at 95-98 (emphasis in original). Collins further stated:

The fact of union is too strong to be interfered with without the presence of the foreigner
bent on dividing us. With the British gone the Orangeman loses that support which
alone made him strong enough to keep his position of domination and isolation. Without
British support he becomes what he is, one of a minority in the Irish Nation. His rights
are the same as those of every Irishman, but he has no rights other than those.
Id. at 96.
152. See supra text accompanying note 151.
153. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss2/1

26

Unification as
Northern SELF-DETERMINATION
Ireland Self-Determination: A Specu
19861 Swan: Irish
NORTHERN
IRELAND

1987. This is the eighteenth consecutive year of the current phase of
Northern Ireland's recurrent nationalist struggle in the name of majority rule self-determination.
B.

Self-Determination in the Late 1980s

A message from the Dublin brigade of the IRA accompanied the July
20, 1982, Provisional IRA strike in London. This post-Falkland Islands War message declared: "Now it is our turn to properly invoke
article 51 of the UN statute and properly quote all Thatcher's fine
phrases on the right to self-determination of a people. The Irish people have sovereign rights which no task force can put down. ' 15" However, Prime Minister Thatcher assailed the "evil and brutal men who
' ' 155
know nothing of democracy.
The preceding discussion comparing Irish and British pronouncements concerning self-determination and democracy may assist the
reader in clarifying which of the two combatant parties in truth
speaks for majority rule. Indeed, in 1983, Prime Minister Thatcher
repeated:
If the majority of the people in Northern Ireland wish not to
be [part of Britain], obviously we would honor their wish,
whether it was to be independent or to join up elsewhere.
Northern Ireland is part of the United56Kingdom because of
the wish of the majority of her people.
Mrs. Thatcher reiterated her views on November 19, 1984, after a
summit meeting with Republic of Ireland Prime Minister Garret
57
Fitzgerald.1
154. 9 Killed as IRA Bombs Rip London, The Toronto (Canada) Star, July 20, 1982, at
A4, col. 6. The University of Alberta's expert on self-determination, Professor Leslie C. Green,
has criticized this declaration. Green, Letter to the Editor, The Globe and Mail (Toronto, Canada), July 28, 1982, at 6, col. 3. The allusion apparently is to Articles 1(2) and 55 (not "51") of
the U.N. Charter (not "statute").
155. IRA Bombs Kill Eight, The Toronto (Canada) Sun, July 21, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
156. Thatcher: On the Record, NEWSWEEK, May 16, 1983, at 49.
157. "Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. She is part of the United Kingdom because that is the wish of the majority of her citizens. The majority wish to stay part of
the United Kingdom." Almond, Talks on Ulster Yield Small Step, Washington (D.C.) Times,
Nov. 21, 1984, at 9A, col. 1.
Mr. FitzGerald did not get the cooperative agreeements his government had hoped for
from this security-shrouded summit at the British prime minister's official home in the
English countryside. But for the first time, he did get an acknowledgement from Mrs.
Thatcher that the Irish government should not be excluded from areas previously considered exclusively internal matters of Britain-policing, prisons and the judiciary of
Northern Ireland.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

27

Florida
Journal of
International Law, Vol.
2, Iss.
2 [1986], Art. 1
LAW
JOURNAL
FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. II

Some parties assessing the foregoing speculative review of the evidence might have concluded that some accommodating implementation of majority rule self-determiantion is appropriate to the Northern Ireland case. However, Mrs. Thatcher also confirmed: "I have
made it quite clear that a unified Ireland was one solution that is out.
A second solution was a confederation of two states. That is out. A
third solution was joint authority. That is out - that is a derogation
15 8
of sovereignty."
Elements of the Northern Ireland Protestant population bitterly
assailed 5 9 the broadly-hailed' 6lIreland-U.K.-Northern Ireland accord. But that agreement does not provide for Irish unification as
Northern Ireland self-determination. Rather, it establishes an Intergovernmental Conference concerned both with Northern Ireland and
with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland. 16' Yet
Article 2(b) concludes: "There is no derogation from the sovereignty
of either the Irish Government or the United Kingdom Government,
and each retains responsibility for the decisions and administration
'
of government within its own jurisdiction."1 62
Future political reappraisal of the British rule over Northern Ireland, constantly disputed since before the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921,
might well utilize not only the self-determination principle, but the
territorial integrity principle of international law. This territorial integrity principle has been included in such diplomatic and international law instruments as Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, 163 Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations,16 4 the
1954 Pacific Charter appended to the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty,'6 6 Part G of the Final Communique of the 1955 Bandung Conference,'6 6 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of
December 14, 1960,167 Article 111(3) of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 66 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625
(XXV) of October 24, 1970,169 and the August 1, 1975, Final Act of
158. British and Irish Chiefs Discuss Ulster's Future, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at 4,
col. 6.
159. Protestants Pelt Police in March in N. Ireland,Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.),
Jan. 5, 1986, at A-16, col. 1.
160. See Editorial, The Irish Accord Holds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
161. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(a), at 1583.
162. Id. art. 2(b), at 1584.
163. 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 131-32 (Supp. 1919).
164. 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 191 (Supp. 1945).
165. For the text of the Pacific Charter, see J. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
TRETIES 1914-1973, at 343 (1974).
166. Cited in G. KAHIN, THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE 84 (1986).
167. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
168. For the text of the O.A.U. Charter, see J. GRENVILLE, supra note 165, at 484.
169. 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
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the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the "Helsinki Agreement"). 17 0 As one commentator observed: "[Tihe British
government will have to both declare their [sic] intention of subscribing to these two fundamental universal principles of self-determination and the promotion of territorial
integrity and to formulate poli71
cies for their implementation.'

170.
171.

14 I.b.M. 1292, 1294-95 (1975).
McEvoy, supra note 75, at 22, col. 3.
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